The SECDEF and CJCS have declared that the new war on terrorism, a dissimilar war against a non-state enemy that functions within worldwide terrorist networks, demands closer coordination by U.S. government agencies and the military in the diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military domains. The thesis of this paper is that Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) must be established in geographic combatant commanders' (theater CINCs) headquarters and employed at the operational level to enable the coordination and integration that is critical for agencies, military forces, and coalition nations to effectively fight in this new war. The current process to coordinate and integrate agencies with military forces to fight together across a CINC's AOR is cumbersome and inefficient. This paper reveals the gap in military-agency planning and integration caused by fundamental differences in their cultures, hierarchies, and insufficient guidance that makes synchronizing the military, agencies, and coalition nations problematic. Further, this paper identifies requirements that bridge this gap to enable the CINC to effectively coordinate and integrate the full capabilities of agencies and military forces. Finally, a JIACG model is proposed illustrating Command Control (C2), describing the divisions, components and the process for the theater CINC staffs to draw from. Armed with the requirements to effectively coordinate and integrate agencies and the military, a JIACG employed from the CINC's headquarters, under an umbrella of military-agency commitment, will enable the synchronization and unity of effort that is crucial. 
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Introduction
As long as international terrorists command, control, and communicate in modern global networks, threatening U.S. vital interests, the war on terrorism will involve U. agencies, and in some cases with the military, is more lateral, based on partnership, cooperation and an association that seeks consensus. Also, most U.S. government agencies lack a strategic or crisis action planning system that develops courses of action and phased operations similar to the military's, hence, agencies tend to rely on the military to lead in the planning and execution of operations involving both. 6 Even when assigned lead agency by the National Security Council (NSC), designation as lead has not carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation.
For example, the executive and legislative branches do not routinely provide the interagency lead along with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations. Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, PDD 56 does recognize the requirement for a fully coordinated pol-mil plan to achieve unity of effort. It also recognizes that "civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components to maximize effect." 10 identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting agency priorities; (6) identify resources of each agency to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort; (7) define end state and exit criteria; (8) maximize the mission's assets to support long term goals; and (9) establish interagency assessment teams. 13 Although this list reveals many requirements to enhance military-agency efforts, additional requirements that provide ways and means to synchronize and integrate their actions are vital. Moreover, the requirements must impact more than just a single mission, event, or assigned objective. They must be relative to continuous coordination at the operational level between agencies and the military -coordination that extends far beyond just planning and execution of any action. In particular, a theater CINC's staff should continuously engage in interagency and U.S. government agency coordination and establish working relationships to build mutual trust long before any crisis action planning is required. (2) Compare CINC's strategic concept, intent, mission and objectives for combatting terrorism with those of participating agencies. Comparing these articles enables agencies to be alert to those entities that can achieve policy objectives for their own agencies. By determining mutual needs between the CINC's mission/goals and those of agencies, common ground can be discovered. The aim is to persuade the military and agencies to rely on each other to achieve common objectives and build mutual trust. 15 This promotes unity of effort and encourages agency participation and support. 17 Finally, agency LNOs bring experience working with foreign government authorities and are able to reveal the cultural differences in a host nation agency's interests, goals, and procedures, thereby enhancing U.S. coordination with coalition nations.
Providing the Means -JIACG
Armed with the requirements to enhance military-agency efforts, what mechanism best enables the CINC to coordinate and integrate U.S. government agencies and military efforts? "Their key role is to foster better understanding between participating forces, agencies, and local government." 21 LNOs represent the single point of contact between their agencies and the CINC.
LNOs should be language qualified, regionally oriented, and have solid knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, goals and culture of their organizations and coalition nations in the region. Plans division works to reduces stovepipe planning between CINCs' JPGs and lead government agencies. This is accomplished by disseminating the CINC's strategy, goals, intent and regional objectives in combating terrorism to the interagency via Joint Staff, and to U.S. government and coalition agencies at the operational level via LNOs. The division also compares U.S. government agency, interagency and coalition nation strategies to determine commonalities to enhance unity of effort, and identify conflicting strategies for JPG resolution. Also, the Plans division must ensure U.S. government agencies, via agency LNOs, are integrated in the Commander's Estimate process to enable agency feedback in the development, analysis, selection and execution of Courses of Action (COAs). Additionally, the Plans division determines requirements for rehearsal of plans.
Rehearsals are critical to confirm military and agency responsibilities, task assignments, and confirm timing and synchronization necessary for successful execution. The C2 model, divisions and process as described is a broad-brush description for JIACG.
A more in-depth analysis, beyond the scope of this paper, is necessary to identify all key components critical to an operational JIACG.
JIACG Challenges -Garnering Military and Agency Commitment
Challenges are expected in changing a military headquarters staff structure and process.
Before buying into JIACG, the CINC and U.S. government agencies demand JIACG deliver significant value to the war fighting effort. To gain commitment requires promoting the process through visibility, engagement and education, and training and exercises for the agencies and military forces involved. The aim is to gain military-agency combined interest and confidence that JIACG Training. As with any new system, it is critical to raise the level of awareness of the userthe agencies and military -to the JIACG principles, applications and process. Thus, JIACG must be integrated in service schools and similar U.S. government agency and interagency training curricula. 26 To develop the confidence between agencies and the CINC staff necessary for effective communication and coordination, precrisis training is required at the operational level for the agencies, interagency, military forces and coalition nations. Additionally, more school seats must be made available for governmental personnel to attend DoD formal schools that cover military joint doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). 27 Also, initial training includes exchange tours and seminars.
Exercises. Exercises for JIACGs and U.S./coalition agencies provide an essential forum for identifying and assessing agency capabilities and core competencies, identifying procedural disconnects, and attaining synergy and unity of effort. 28 A suggested model to develop JIACG exercises comes from U.S. Southern Command's Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS). In 1991 Southern Command developed CMASS, a political-military game to address counter drug issues and promote unity of effort among the agencies involved in the war on drugs.
From 1991 to 1993, seven CMASS exercises were conducted involving key U.S. and host nation military and agency representatives. CMASS significantly contributed towards interagency cooperation at the policy level both in Washington, and promoted teamwork among U.S and host nation operators in the field. 29 Developing a similar system to address integration and coordination issues among military and agencies combatting terrorism, and incorporating the JIACG process in the exercise scenarios, would be a valuable tool to enhance synergy and unity of effort. Common objectives of a CMASS type game to fight terrorism include:
--Enhance effectiveness of US interagency operations.
--Assist theater CINC and component commanders and staffs to understand the support required by US country teams and agencies.
--Improve regional coordination to increase host nation and law enforcement capabilities to counter terrorism.
--Aid in synchronization of resources; and enhance the planning and operations of interagency players, the country teams and the host nations.
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Conclusion
While SECDEF and the CJCS have declared that the new dissimilar war on terrorism requires closer coordination in the diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military domains, the current process for U.S. government agencies and the military to do so is cumbersome and inefficient. The gap in planning and integrating military-agency efforts caused by fundamental differences in their cultures, hierarchies, and insufficient guidance, make synchronizing the military and agency in the current process problematic.
The CINC is in the unique position to coordinate and integrate military and agency actions regionally. A JIACG, employed from the CINC's headquarters, armed with the requirements to effectively coordinate and integrate the full capabilities of the military and agencies, under an umbrella of military-agency commitment to the JIACG process, will enable the synchronization and unity of effort that is crucial to effectively fight terrorism in the CINC's AOR.
